Deportees Gain UK-Funded Startups Abroad
Home Office extends business aid to 16,803 foreign offenders and illegal migrants
The Home Office's reintegration programme uses taxpayer money to support deported criminals with business setups and training, as enforced removals hit historic lows. This cross-party policy prioritizes global obligations over domestic enforcement, funding NGOs that oppose border controls.
The Home Office allocates taxpayer funds to equip deported foreign criminals with business startup aid, even as enforced removals languish at two-fifths of their 2004 levels. Ministers tout deportation records, yet the data shows a reliance on cheaper voluntary schemes that include cash incentives up to £2,000 per person. This approach prioritizes post-removal support over robust border enforcement.
The Returns Reintegration Programme targets individuals from countries like Albania, Nigeria, and Pakistan, offering mental health counseling, vocational training, and entrepreneurial assistance. Eligible participants include not only voluntary returnees but also those forcibly deported after committing crimes in the UK. In the past year alone, 16,803 such returns could qualify for these services if the scheme expands as planned.
Enforced deportations have collapsed over two decades. In 2004, authorities removed 21,425 foreign nationals by force; by 2024, that figure dwindled to 8,169. The Labour government managed just 9,071 in its first 12 months, far below historical peaks and contradicting claims of unprecedented action by figures like Immigration Minister Mike Tapp.
Voluntary returns serve as a fiscal shortcut. These schemes pay between £500 and £2,000 to encourage departure, compared to £15,000 for each enforced removal. Officials classify these as self-initiated exits, but the incentives undermine the deterrent effect of immigration laws.
The programme stems from the UN Global Compact for Migration, which the UK endorsed under Theresa May in 2018. This international commitment mandates support for reintegration in origin countries to ease burdens on receiving states. Both Conservative and Labour administrations have upheld it, extending aid to offenders like child sex abuser Hadush Kebatu, who received £500 despite his crimes.
Such support extends beyond individuals. Contracts for the 2026-2028 phase will channel funds to non-governmental organizations, many of which campaign against stricter UK immigration policies. These groups gain resources to challenge deportations and advocate for open borders, creating a feedback loop that sustains policy inertia.
Victims bear the hidden costs. Kebatu’s survivor described the payout as a reward for her assault, amplifying trauma in a system already strained by low removal rates. British citizens face untreated mental health needs while public money flows abroad, highlighting a misalignment of priorities.
This pattern exposes deeper institutional failures. Governments across parties pledge border control but deliver declining enforcement, with resources diverted to compliance with global pacts over national sovereignty. The Home Office’s procurement notice signals no reversal; instead, it entrenches a system where deportation becomes a subsidized relocation service.
Accountability remains elusive. No officials face repercussions for the drop in removals or the expansion of aid to criminals. Ministers issue statements on tough action, but procurement documents reveal the opposite: preparation for broader support networks that could encompass thousands more returnees from countries like Somalia and Morocco.
The implications ripple through public finances and security. Each voluntary return saves short-term costs but acts as a pull factor, signaling leniency to potential entrants. Over time, this erodes deterrence, perpetuates irregular migration, and burdens taxpayers with an estimated annual outlay for programmes that yield no domestic benefit.
Britain’s immigration apparatus operates in reverse. Enforcement weakens while reintegration flourishes, funded by the same public purse that strains under domestic pressures. This reveals a governance model captured by international norms and administrative expediency, where the UK’s borders serve foreign interests more than its own citizens.
The uncomfortable truth lies in the continuity. Conservative legacies like the UN compact enable Labour’s expansions, and neither side disrupts the cycle. Deportation policy documents not control but concession, accelerating the erosion of sovereign authority in an already fragmented state.
Commentary based on Migration Central by Centre for Migration Control on migrationcentral.co.uk.